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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
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09/866,425

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Andrew J. Vilcauskas JR.

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09/06/2006

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EXAMINER

WASSUM, LUKE S

ART UNIT

PAPER NUMBER

2167

DATE MAILED: 09/06/2006

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

Office Action Summary

Application No.

09/866,425

Applicant(s)

VILCAUSKAS ET AL.

Examiner

Luke S. Wassum

Art Unit

2167

-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --

Period for Reply

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 3 MONTH(S) OR THIRTY (30) DAYS, WHICHEVER IS LONGER, FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133). Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

Status

- 1) ☒ Responsive to communication(s) filed on 04 August 2006.
- 2a) ☐ This action is FINAL. 2b) ☒ This action is non-final.
- 3) ☐ Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.

Disposition of Claims

- 4) ☒ Claim(s) 21-42 is/are pending in the application.
- 4a) Of the above claim(s) _____ is/are withdrawn from consideration.
- 5) ☐ Claim(s) _____ is/are allowed.
- 6) ☒ Claim(s) 21-42 is/are rejected.
- 7) ☐ Claim(s) _____ is/are objected to.
- 8) ☐ Claim(s) _____ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

Application Papers

- 9) ☐ The specification is objected to by the Examiner.
- 10) ☒ The drawing(s) filed on 24 May 2001 is/are: a) ☒ accepted or b) ☐ objected to by the Examiner.
- Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).
- Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correction is required if the drawing(s) is objected to. See 37 CFR 1.121(d).
- 11) ☐ The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner. Note the attached Office Action or form PTO-152.

Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119

- 12) ☐ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).
- a) ☐ All b) ☐ Some * c) ☐ None of:
1. ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.
2. ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. _____.
3. ☐ Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).

* See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.

Attachment(s)

- 1) ☐ Notice of References Cited (PTO-892)
- 2) ☐ Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948)
- 3) ☐ Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO/SB/08)
Paper No(s)/Mail Date _____.
- 4) ☐ Interview Summary (PTO-413)
Paper No(s)/Mail Date. _____.
- 5) ☐ Notice of Informal Patent Application
- 6) ☐ Other: _____.

DETAILED ACTION

Continued Examination Under 37 CFR 1.114

1. A request for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, including the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e), was filed in this application after final rejection. Since this application is eligible for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, and the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e) has been timely paid, the finality of the previous Office action has been withdrawn pursuant to 37 CFR 1.114. Applicant's submission filed on 4 August 2006 has been entered.

Response to Amendment

2. The Applicants' amendment, filed 4 August 2006, has been received, entered into the record, and considered.

3. As a result of the amendment, new claims 41 and 42 have been added. Claims 21-42 are now pending in the application.

Priority

4. The Applicants' claim to domestic priority under 35 U.S.C. §119(e), to provisional application 60/207,698, filed 26 May 2000, is acknowledged. Since the subject matter of

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the parent provisional application encompasses that of the instant application and claims, a priority date of 26 May 2000 is hereby established.

The Invention

5. The claimed invention is drawn to a method of presenting advertisements in a computer system through the use of popunder windows. Alternative claimed embodiments are implemented in other media, such as a PDA, telephone, television and radio.

Declaration under 37 C.F.R. § 1.131.

6. The affidavit filed on 11 January 2006 under 37 CFR § 1.131 has been considered but is ineffective to overcome the **Porn Rodeo** reference ("source code of www.pornrodeo.com as of 15 November 1999").

Formal Requirements of a Declaration

7. From MPEP § 715.04[R-2]:

The following parties may make an affidavit or declaration under 37 CFR § 1.131:

(A) All the inventors of the subject matter claimed.

(B) An affidavit or declaration by less than all named inventors of an application is accepted where it is shown that less than all named inventors of an application invented the subject matter of the claim or claims under rejection. For example, one of two joint inventors is accepted where it is shown that one of the joint inventors is the sole inventor of the claim or claims under rejection.

(C) **> If a petition under 37 CFR § 1.47 was granted or the application was accepted under 37 CFR § 1.42 or 1.43, the affidavit or declaration may be signed by the 37 CFR § 1.47 applicant or the legal representative, where appropriate.< .

(D) The assignee or other party in interest when it is not possible to produce the affidavit or declaration of the inventor. *Ex parte Foster*, 1903 C.D. 213, 105 O.G. 261 (Comm'r Pat. 1903).

Affidavits or declarations to overcome a rejection of a claim or claims must be made by the inventor or inventors of the subject matter of the rejected claim(s), a party qualified under 37 CFR §§ 1.42, 1.43, or 1.47, or the assignee or other party in interest when it is not possible to produce the affidavit or declaration of the inventor(s). Thus, where all of the named inventors of a pending application are not inventors of every claim of the application, any affidavit under 37 CFR § 1.131 could be signed by only the inventor(s) of the subject matter of the rejected claims. Further, where it is shown that a joint inventor is deceased, refuses to sign, or is otherwise unavailable, the signatures of the remaining joint inventors are sufficient. However, the affidavit or declaration, even though signed by fewer than all the joint inventors, must show completion of the invention by all of the joint inventors of the subject matter of the claim(s) under rejection. *In re Carlson*, 79 F.2d 900, 27 USPQ 400 (CCPA 1935).

An affidavit is a statement in writing made under oath before a notary public, magistrate, or officer authorized to administer oaths. See MPEP § 604 through § 604.06 for additional information regarding formal requirements of affidavits. 37 CFR § 1.68 permits a declaration to be used instead of an affidavit. The declaration must include an acknowledgment by the declarant that willful false statements and the like are punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both (18 U.S.C. § 1001) and may jeopardize the validity of the application or any patent issuing thereon. The declarant must set forth in the body of the declaration that all statements made of the declarant's own knowledge are true and that all statements made on information and belief are believed to be true.

8. From MPEP 602 (II):

U.S. Patent and Trademark Office personnel are authorized to accept a statutory declaration under 28 U.S.C. § 1746 filed in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office in lieu of an "oath" or declaration under 35 U.S.C. § 25 and 37 CFR § 1.68, provided that the statutory declaration otherwise complies with the requirements of law. Section 1746 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides:

Whenever, under any law of the United States or under any rule, regulation, order, or requirement made pursuant to law, any matter is required to be supported, evidenced, established, or proved by sworn declaration, verification, certificate, statement, oath or affidavit, in writing of the person making the same (other than a deposition, or an oath of office, or an oath required to be taken before a specified official other than notary public), such matter may, with like force and effect, be supported, evidenced, established, or

proved by the unsworn declaration, certificate, verification, or statement, in writing of such person which is subscribed by him, as true under penalty of perjury, and dated, in substantially the following form:

[1] If executed without the United States:

"I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on (date).
(Signature)."

[2] If executed within the United States its territories, possessions, or commonwealths:

"I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on (date).
(Signature)."

9. The Applicants' declaration fulfills all of the formal requirements for submission of a declaration under 37 C.F.R. §1.131. The examiner will now consider the merits of the declarations.

Allegation of FACTS

10. MPEP § 715.07 (I) states, *inter alia*,

The essential thing to be shown under 37 CFR § 1.131 is priority of invention and this may be done by any satisfactory evidence of the fact. FACTS, not conclusions, must be alleged.

Evidence in the form of exhibits may accompany the affidavit or declaration. Each exhibit relied upon should be specifically referred to in the affidavit or declaration, in terms of what it is relied upon to show.

A general allegation that the invention was completed prior to the date of the reference is not sufficient. *Ex parte Saunders*, 1883 C.D. 23, 23 O.G. 1224 (Comm'r Pat. 1883). Similarly, a declaration by the inventor to the effect that his or her invention was conceived or reduced to practice prior to the reference date, without a statement of facts demonstrating the correctness of this conclusion, is insufficient to satisfy 37 CFR § 1.131.

The affidavit or declaration and exhibits must clearly explain which facts or data applicant is relying on to show completion of his or her invention prior to the particular date. Vague and general statements in broad terms about what the exhibits describe along with a general assertion that the exhibits describe a reduction to practice "amounts essentially to mere pleading, unsupported by proof or a showing of facts" and, thus, does not satisfy the requirements of 37 CFR § 1.131(b). *In re Borkowski*, 505 F.2d 713, 184 USPQ 29 (CCPA 1974). Applicant must give a clear explanation of the exhibits pointing out exactly what facts are established and relied on by applicant. 505 F.2d at 718-19, 184 USPQ at 33. See also *In re Harry*, 333 F.2d 920, 142 USPQ 164 (CCPA 1964) (Affidavit "asserts that facts exist but does not tell what they are or when the occurred.").

11. In the case of the instant declaration, the Applicants have alleged various facts regarding the Exhibit submitted with the declaration, said facts supporting a reduction to practice of the claimed invention prior to 13 October 1999.

As such, the Applicants have met their burden under 37 C.F.R. § 1.131(b).

Conception

12. From MPEP § 715.07 (III):

The affidavit or declaration must state FACTS and produce such documentary evidence and exhibits in support thereof as are available to show conception and completion of invention in this country or in a NAFTA or WTO member country (MPEP § 715.07(c)), at least the conception being at a date prior to the effective date of the reference. Where there has not been reduction to practice prior to the date of the reference, the applicant or patent owner must also show diligence in the completion of his or her invention from a time just prior to the date of the reference continuously up to the date of an actual reduction to practice or up to the date of filing his or her application (filing constitutes a constructive reduction to practice, 37 CFR § 1.131). As discussed above, 37 CFR § 1.131(b) provides three ways in which an applicant can establish prior invention of the claimed subject matter. The showing of facts must be sufficient to show:

(A) reduction to practice of the invention prior to the effective date of the reference; or

(B) conception of the invention prior to the effective date of the reference coupled with due diligence from prior to the reference date to a subsequent (actual) reduction to practice; or

(C) conception of the invention prior to the effective date of the reference coupled with due diligence from prior to the reference date to the filing date of the application (constructive reduction to practice).

Conception is the mental part of the inventive act, but it must be capable of proof, as by drawings, complete disclosure to another person, etc. In *Mergenthaler v. Scudder*, 1897 C.D. 724, 81 O.G. 1417 (D.C. Cir. 1897), it was established that conception is more than a mere vague idea of how to solve a problem; the means themselves and their interaction must be comprehended also.

13. From MPEP § 2138.04[R-1]:

Conception has been defined as "the complete performance of the mental part of the inventive act" and it is "the formation in the mind of the inventor of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention as it is thereafter to be applied in practice...." *Townsend v. Smith*, 36 F.2d 292, 295, 4 USPQ 269, 271 (CCPA 1930). "[C]onception is established when the invention is made sufficiently clear to enable one skilled in the art to reduce it to practice without the exercise of extensive experimentation or the exercise of inventive skill." *Hiatt v. Ziegler*, 179 USPQ 757, 763 (Bd. Pat. Inter.1973). Conception has also been defined as a disclosure of an invention which enables one skilled in the art to reduce the invention to a practical form without "exercise of the inventive faculty." *Gunter v. Stream*, 573 F.2d 77, 197 USPQ 482 (CCPA 1978). See also *Coleman v. Dines*, 754 F.2d 353, 224 USPQ 857 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (It is settled that in establishing conception a party must show possession of every feature recited in the count, and that every limitation of the count must have been known to the inventor at the time of the alleged conception. Conception must be proved by corroborating evidence.)

14. In the case of the instant affidavit, since the Applicants are alleging actual reduction to practice before the date of the applied reference, the date of conception is not an issue.

Diligence

15. From MPEP § 715.07(a):

Where conception occurs prior to the date of the reference, but reduction to practice is afterward, it is not enough merely to allege that applicant or patent owner had been diligent. *Ex parte Hunter*, 1889 C.D. 218, 49 O.G. 733 (Comm'r Pat. 1889). Rather, applicant must show evidence of facts establishing diligence.

What is meant by diligence is brought out in *Christie v. Seybold*, 1893 C.D. 515, 64 O.G. 1650 (6th Cir. 1893). In patent law, an inventor is either diligent at a given time or he is not diligent; there are no degrees of diligence. An applicant may be diligent within the meaning of the patent law when he or she is doing nothing, if his or her lack of activity is excused. Note, however, that the record must set forth an explanation or excuse for the inactivity; the USPTO or courts will not speculate on possible explanations for delay or inactivity. See *In re Nelson*, 420 F.2d 1079, 164 USPQ 458 (CCPA 1970). Diligence must be judged on the basis of the particular facts in each case. See MPEP § 2138.06 for a detailed discussion of the diligence requirement for proving prior invention.

Under 37 CFR 1.131, the critical period in which diligence must be shown begins just prior to the effective date of the reference or activity and ends with the date of a reduction to practice, either actual or constructive (i.e., filing a United States

patent application). Note, therefore, that only diligence before reduction to practice is a material consideration. The "lapse of time between the completion or reduction to practice of an invention and the filing of an application thereon" is not relevant to an affidavit or declaration under 37 CFR 1.131. See *Ex parte Merz*, 75 USPQ 296 (Bd. App. 1947).

16. As stated above, since the Applicants allege an actual reduction to practice prior to the date of the applied reference, diligence is not at issue.

Reduction to Practice

17. Regarding reduction to practice, MPEP § 715.07 states:

In general, proof of actual reduction to practice requires a showing that the apparatus actually existed and worked for its intended purpose.

18. From MPEP § 2138.05:

Reduction to practice may be an actual reduction or a constructive reduction to practice which occurs when a patent application on the claimed invention is filed. The filing of a patent application serves as conception and constructive reduction to practice of the subject matter described in the application. Thus the inventor need not provide evidence of either conception or actual

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reduction to practice when relying on the content of the patent application. *Hyatt v. Boone*, 146 F.3d 1348, 1352, 47 USPQ2d 1128, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

When a party to an interference seeks the benefit of an earlier-filed U.S. patent application, the earlier application must meet the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 120 and 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph for the subject matter of the count. The earlier application must meet the enablement requirement and must contain a written description of the subject matter of the interference count. *Hyatt v. Boone*, 146 F.3d 1348, 1352, 47 USPQ2d 1128, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Proof of a constructive reduction to practice requires sufficient disclosure under the "how to use" and "how to make" requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. *Kawai v. Metlesics*, 480 F.2d 880, 886, 178 USPQ 158, 163 (CCPA 1973) (A constructive reduction to practice is not proven unless the specification discloses a practical utility where one would not be obvious. Prior art which disclosed an anticonvulsant compound which differed from the claimed compound only in the absence of a -CH₂- group connecting two functional groups was not sufficient to establish utility of the claimed compound because the compounds were not so closely related that they could be presumed to have the same utility.). The purpose of the written description requirement is "to ensure that the inventor had possession, as of the filing date of the application relied on, of the specific subject matter later claimed by him." *In re Edwards*, 568 F.2d 1349, 1351-52, 196 USPQ 465, 467 (CCPA 1978). The written description must include all of the limitations of the interference count, or the applicant must show that any absent text is necessarily comprehended in the description provided and would have been so understood at the time the patent application was filed. Furthermore, the written description must be sufficient, when the entire specification is considered, such that the "necessary and only reasonable construction" that would be given it by a person skilled in the art is one that clearly supports each positive limitation in the count. *Hyatt v. Boone*, 146 F.3d at 1354-55, 47 USPQ2d at 1130-1132 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (The claim could be read as

describing subject matter other than that of the count and thus did not establish that the applicant was in possession of the invention of the count.). See also *Bigham v. Godtfredsen*, 857 F.2d 1415, 1417, 8 USPQ2d 1266, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("[t]he generic term halogen comprehends a limited number of species, and ordinarily constitutes a sufficient written description of the common halogen species, except where the halogen species are patentably distinct).

"In an interference proceeding, a party seeking to establish an actual reduction to practice must satisfy a two-prong test: (1) the party constructed an embodiment or performed a process that met every element of the interference count, and (2) the embodiment or process operated for its intended purpose." *Eaton v. Evans*, 204 F.3d 1094, 1097, 53 USPQ2d 1696, 1698 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

The same evidence sufficient for a constructive reduction to practice may be insufficient to establish an actual reduction to practice, which requires a showing of the invention in a physical or tangible form that shows every element of the count. *Wetmore v. Quick*, 536 F.2d 937, 942, 190 USPQ 223, 227 (CCPA 1976). For an actual reduction to practice, the invention must have been sufficiently tested to demonstrate that it will work for its intended purpose, but it need not be in a commercially satisfactory stage of development.

If a device is so simple, and its purpose and efficacy so obvious, construction alone is sufficient to demonstrate workability. *King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp.*, 767 F.2d 853, 860, 226 USPQ 402, 407 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

For additional cases pertaining to the requirements necessary to establish actual reduction to practice see *DSL Dynamic Sciences, Ltd. v. Union Switch & Signal, Inc.*, 928 F.2d 1122, 1126, 18 USPQ2d 1152, 1155 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("events occurring after an alleged actual reduction to practice can call into question whether reduction to practice has in fact occurred"); *Corona v. Dovan*, 273 U.S. 692, 1928 C.D. 252 (1928) ("A process is reduced to practice when it is successfully performed. A machine is reduced to practice when it is assembled, adjusted and used. A manufacture [i.e., article of manufacture] is reduced to practice when it is completely

manufactured. A composition of matter is reduced to practice when it is completely composed." 1928 C.D. at 262-263 (emphasis added).); *Fitzgerald v. Arbib*, 268 F.2d 763, 765-66, 122 USPQ 530, 531-32 (CCPA 1959) ("the reduction to practice of a three-dimensional design invention requires the production of an article embodying that design" in "other than a mere drawing").

"The nature of testing which is required to establish a reduction to practice depends on the particular facts of each case, especially the nature of the invention." *Gellert v. Wanberg*, 495 F.2d 779, 783, 181 USPQ 648, 652 (CCPA 1974) ("an invention may be tested sufficiently ... where less than all of the conditions of actual use are duplicated by the tests"); *Wells v. Fremont*, 177 USPQ 22, 24-5 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1972) ("even where tests are conducted under bench' or laboratory conditions, those conditions must fully duplicate each and every condition of actual use' or if they do not, then the evidence must establish a relationship between the subject matter, the test condition and the intended functional setting of the invention," but it is not required that all the conditions of all actual uses be duplicated, such as rain, snow, mud, dust and submersion in water).

19. In this case, an actual reduction to practice is alleged to have occurred prior to 13 October 1999. However, actual reduction to practice is not fully supported by the html document submitted as evidence.

20. The Exhibit submitted by the Applicants is an html script which, when executed in a foreground browser window, opens another browser window containing content, which is then a background browser window.

The examiner notes that this Exhibit discloses exactly the same subject matter (and nothing more) as the **Tetrode** reference, dated 26 August 1996, which was made of record in the first Office action on the merits, mailed 12 February 2003.

21. In the first action, the examiner rejected claims 1, 2, 4, 7-12, 14, 15 and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by the **Tetrode** reference. In the Applicants' response, they argued that the reference "at most teach[es] that a programming language has the capability of bringing a window held in the background forward", and that it failed to teach or suggest a "traffic building resource" as required by the claims of record at the time.

Based in part upon the Applicants' arguments, the examiner withdrew the claim rejections based upon the **Tetrode** reference.

22. Rejections of claims 1, 2, 4, 7-12, 14, 15 and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) as being anticipated by the **Porn Rodeo** reference were maintained by the examiner, however (see Final Rejection, mailed 8 September 2003), in part because although the **Tetrode** and **Porn Rodeo** references disclosed substantially the same JavaScript code, the **Porn Rodeo** reference taught its use for 'traffic building', more commonly termed advertising.

23. The claims were subsequently amended to explicitly cite a system for advertising (see claims filed with a Request for Continued Examination, received by the Office on 12 February 2004).

The examiner rejected these claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being an obvious combination of **Landsman et al.** (U.S. Provisional Application Publication 2003/0004804) in view of the **Porn Rodeo** reference.

It should be noted that the examiner did not, however, reject the claims under the combination of the **Landsman et al.** reference and the **Tetrode** reference, since such a combination (using the 'popunder' window features disclosed by **Tetrode** as part of the advertising system taught by **Landsman et al.**) would not likely have been obvious to an ordinary artisan, particularly in light of the intervening nearly-4-year period between the **Tetrode** reference and the priority date of the instant invention. While the **Porn Rodeo** reference clearly suggested the use of the disclosed popunder window for advertising or promotional purposes, the **Tetrode** reference completely lacked any suggestion of such a use.

24. The requirements for an affidavit under 37 C.F.R. § 1.131, in light of the CCPA decisions rendered in *In re Stryker* (CCPA) 168 USPQ 372 (1971) and *In re Dardick*

(CCPA) 181 USPQ 834 (1974), in removing a secondary reference used in a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is that (1) the showing under Rule 131 be adequate to read on the subject matter disclosed by said reference, and that (2) the differences between the claimed invention and the reference disclosure are so small as to render the claims obvious over the reference (see *In re Stryker* at 373).

25. However, the Exhibit submitted by the Applicants fails to read on the subject matter disclosed by the **Porn Rodeo** reference, since it fails to disclose or suggest the use of the disclosed popunder window script for the purposes of advertising or promotion.

While the Applicants allege such as use in their declaration (see item 3 "...opens another browser window containing content **such as an advertisement...**", emphasis added), the Exhibit itself provides no evidence or suggestion that the opened window would be used to display an advertisement.

26. The examiner also points out that were the Exhibit sufficient to suggest the use of the popunder window for the purposes of advertising or promotion (and thus render the claimed invention obvious in combination with the **Landsman et al.** reference, therefore removing the **Porn Rodeo** reference as prior art), then the examiner would be

compelled to reject the claims as obvious over the combination of the **Landsman et al.** reference in view of the **Tetrode** reference.

27. Simply put, the Exhibit submitted by the Applicants in support of their Rule 131 declaration merely demonstrates that the Applicants had knowledge of a mechanism to create a popunder window, knowledge that was in the prior art since at least August 1996. Since the Exhibit fails to prove that the Applicants reduced to practice a mechanism for using popunder windows to display advertisements (which is the inventive concept), it is insufficient to remove the **Porn Rodeo** reference as prior art.

28. For the reasons cited above, the declarations filed by the Applicants under 37 C.F.R. § 1.131 fail to establish that the claimed invention was reduced to practice prior to the critical period, and also fails to establish that the claimed invention was conceived prior to the critical period and diligently reduced to practice thereafter. As such, the affidavit is insufficient to establish invention prior to the prior art references relied upon in the rejections of record. The rejections are maintained by the examiner.

Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102

29. The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:

A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –

(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for a patent.

30. Claims 41 and 42 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a) as being anticipated by **Porn Rodeo** ("source code of www.pornrodeo.com as of 15 November 1999").

31. Regarding claim 41, **Porn Rodeo** teaches a system for Internet advertising for use in a media capable of simultaneously maintaining a foreground window and at least one background window and capable of displaying a first browser in a said foreground window for selectively browsing the Internet, said system comprising a script handler that invokes a post-session procedure in said first browser, said post-session procedure opening an advertisement in a second browser and maintaining said second browser in a said background window while said first browser is simultaneously displayed in said foreground window (see window.open and window.focus calls on page 1, lines 15-20).

32. Regarding claim 42, **Porn Rodeo** additionally teaches a system for Internet advertising where the script handler comprises code in a web page displayed in said first browser (see the 'leaving()' function embedded in the html source code of the www.pornrodeo.com source code, lines 20-26).

Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103

33. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103(a) which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:

(a) A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.

34. The factual inquiries set forth in *Graham v. John Deere Co.*, 383 U.S. 1, 148 USPQ 459 (1966), that are applied for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) are summarized as follows:

1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.

35. This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims under 35 U.S.C. 103(a), the examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned at the time any inventions covered therein were made absent any evidence to the contrary. Applicant is advised of the obligation under 37 CFR 1.56 to point out the inventor and invention dates of each claim that was not commonly owned at the time a later invention was made in order for the examiner to consider the applicability of 35 U.S.C. 103(c) and potential 35 U.S.C. 102(e), (f) or (g) prior art under 35 U.S.C. 103(a).

36. Claims 21-40 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over **Landsman et al.** (U.S. Patent Application Publication 2003/0004804) in view of **Porn Rodeo** ("source code of www.pornrodeo.com as of 15 November 1999").

37. Regarding claim 21, **Landsman et al.** teaches a system for Internet advertising for use in a media capable of simultaneously maintaining a foreground window and at least one background window and capable of displaying a first browser in a said foreground window for selectively browsing the Internet substantially as claimed, said system comprising:

- a) a script handler that invokes a post-session procedure in said first browser (see disclosure that HTML advertising tags are embedded in a web page, Abstract; see also Figures 2A and 2B); and
- b) an event handler that receives, from an Internet address, a link to an advertisement and loads said advertisement (see paragraphs [0003], [0016], [0017], [0036]-[0038], [0087], [0095], [0107] and [0109]).

Landsman et al. does not explicitly teach a system wherein said post-session procedure opens a second browser in a background window while said first browser is simultaneously displayed in said foreground window, and wherein said advertisement is loaded into said second browser in said background window.

Porn Rodeo, however, teaches a system wherein said post-session procedure opens a second browser in a background window while said first browser is simultaneously displayed in said foreground window, and wherein said advertisement is loaded into said second browser in said background window (see window.open and window.focus calls on page 1, lines 15-20).

It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to open a browser in the background and load the advertisement directly into the browser, since this would allow the display of the advertisement to the user (by moving the browser window to the foreground) without the need to open a new window, load any required player files, and load and render the advertisement, thus speeding the display of the advertisement to the user.

38. Regarding claim 31, **Landsman et al.** teaches a post-session advertising method for use in media capable of simultaneously maintaining a background window and a foreground window, said method comprising the steps of:

- a) embedding post-session instructions into a first browser, said first browser for being displayed in said foreground window (see disclosure that HTML advertising tags are embedded in a web page, Abstract; see also Figures 2A and 2B);
- b) said post-session instructions receiving, from an Internet address, a link to an advertisement (see discussion of a request for, and receipt of, an AdDescriptor file, a text file containing a list of file names and

corresponding URLs at which these files reside, paragraphs [0103] through [0107]); and

c) loading said advertisement (see paragraph [0107]).

Landsman et al. does not explicitly teach a method wherein said post-session instructions open a second browser in a background window while said first browser is simultaneously displayed in said foreground window, and wherein said advertisement is loaded into said second browser in said background window.

Porn Rodeo, however, teaches a method wherein said post-session procedure opens a second browser in a background window while said first browser is simultaneously displayed in said foreground window, and wherein said advertisement is loaded into said second browser in said background window (see window.open and window.focus calls on page 1, lines 15-20).

It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to open a browser in the background and load the advertisement directly into the browser, since this would allow the display of the advertisement to the user (by moving the browser window to the foreground) without the need to open a new

window, load any required player files, and load and render the advertisement, thus speeding the display of the advertisement to the user.

39. Regarding claims 22 and 32, **Porn Rodeo** additionally teaches a system and method wherein said second browser is opened in response to a load-triggering event (see window.open call on page 1, lines 16-17, showing that the load-triggering event was the loading of the porn rodeo web page).

40. Regarding claims 23 and 33, **Porn Rodeo** additionally teaches a system and method wherein said load-triggering event comprises at least one of clicking on an off-site link, entering a new address, refreshing a web site, exiting a web site, and being redirected to a web site (see window.open call on page 1, lines 16-17, showing that the load-triggering event was the loading of the porn rodeo web page, analogous to both refreshing a web site and being redirected to a web site, since both would entail the loading of the web page).

41. Regarding claims 24, 25, 34 and 35, **Landsman et al.** additionally teaches a system and method wherein said script handler delays invocation of said post-session

procedure for a predetermined period of time, and wherein said script handler cancels invocation of said post-session procedure if a user loads a new web site in said first browser before said predetermined time period has elapsed (see disclosure of the timer based frame targeted advertisements, paragraph [0159]).

42. Regarding claims 26 and 36, **Landsman et al.** additionally teaches a system and method wherein said second browser is displayed in a foreground window after the occurrence of a view-triggering event (see paragraphs [0037] and [0038]).

43. Regarding claims 27 and 37, **Landsman et al.** additionally teaches a system and method including a focus timer that tracks the duration that said second browser is displayed in said foreground window (see paragraph [0050]).

44. Regarding claims 28 and 38, **Landsman et al.** additionally teaches a system and method wherein said media comprises one of a computer, a PDA, a cell phone and a television (see disclosure that the system is executed in a computer, Abstract).

45. Regarding claims 29 and 39, **Landsman et al.** additionally teaches a system and method wherein said event handler selects and returns one of a plurality of advertisements maintained at said Internet address (see paragraph [0104]).

46. Regarding claims 30 and 40, **Porn Rodeo** additionally teaches a system and method capable of opening a plurality of second browsers, each maintained in a separate background window, said event handler capable of receiving a link to an advertisement for each browser and loading a respective said advertisement into each said second browser while each said second browser remains in its respective said background window (see window.open and window.focus calls on page 1, lines 15-20, code that would open an additional background window each time the web page was refreshed).

Response to Arguments

47. Applicant's arguments filed 4 August 2006 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.

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48. The examiner has considered the merits of the declaration filed under 37 C.F.R. 1.131, but has found that it is insufficient to establish reduction to practice of the entire claimed invention prior to the date of the **Porn Rodeo** reference. See above discussion for further details.

49. Regarding the specific arguments presented by the Applicants with regard to the examiner's previous rejection of the Rule 131 declaration, they are for the most part well taken. However, in light of the above discussion, the declaration is insufficient to remove the **Porn Rodeo** reference as prior art.

Conclusion


Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Luke S. Wassum whose telephone number is 571-272-4119. The examiner can normally be reached on Monday-Friday 8:30-5:30, alternate Fridays off.

If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's supervisor, John R. Cottingham can be reached on 571-272-7079. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.

In addition, INFORMAL or DRAFT communications may be faxed directly to the examiner at 571-273-4119. Such communications must be clearly marked as INFORMAL, DRAFT or UNOFFICIAL.

Customer Service for Tech Center 2100 can be reached during regular business hours at (571) 272-2100, or fax (571) 273-2100.

Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see <http://pair-direct.uspto.gov>. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative or access to the automated information system, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000.


Luke S. Wassum
Primary Examiner
Art Unit 2167

lsw
1 September 2006